Studies of World War II often stress the Soviet Union’s actions in defeating Germany, thereby relegating the contributions made by the Western Allies to secondary importance. I disagree with this view and would argue that no one nation was solely or primarily responsible for the defeat of Germany. Instead, this was a collective effort in which each of the major Allied belligerents played a critical role in attaining the ultimate victory.

In viewing these contributions, it is fitting to start with the Soviet Union since it provided the bulk of the manpower and brute force to the Allied cause. The Soviets were also the main antagonists to the German army and the single greatest instrument in that army’s destruction. Unlike the Western Allies, who waged war across multiple fronts and theatres, the Soviets almost exclusively limited their efforts to a single, colossal contest pitted against the bulk of the German army over a period of nearly four years.

In doing so, they confronted between 60 and 80 percent of the German army’s combat strength (depending upon the time frame) and inflicted over 80 percent of German ground casualties for most of the war. This was particularly true during the first three years of their involvement before the Western Allies landed in Normandy. During this period (22 June 1941 through 31 May 1944) German ground losses in the East numbered 4,120,232 total casualties. By comparison, German casualties in North Africa, Sicily and Italy during this same period numbered fewer than half a million men.

Counterbalancing this Soviet contribution was the Western Alliance made up predominantly by the British Commonwealth and United States.

Unlike the Soviets, who waged a single-front war focused almost entirely on the destruction of the German army in the field, the Western Allies conducted the war on a multi-front and multidimensional basis.

In terms of the former, this forced Germany to ultimately wage a five-front war. Of these fronts, only one involved the Soviet Union; that being the eastern front. The remaining four fronts were all waged against the Western Allies. These consisted of the western front in Northwest Europe; the southern front involving the conflict in Africa and Southern Europe; the aerial front, which primarily consisted of Germany’s attempt to oppose the strategic bombing campaign; and the maritime front, which was overwhelmingly conducted in the Atlantic and waters off Northwest Europe. Through their substantial efforts on these various fronts, the Western Allies not only contested the German army, but engaged all aspects of the German war machine and its war making capability.

Yet, even within the domain of the overarching Soviet goal, the Western Allies played a significant role in bringing about the destruction of German ground forces. By the spring of 1944, the German army was still largely intact despite the mauling it had received on both its eastern and (to a far lesser extent) southern flanks. Likewise, the Germans still controlled an empire that spanned across most of Europe. In less than one year, this army and empire were totally destroyed. During this period of climactic decision, the Soviets still confronted roughly 60 percent of the German army, but the Western Allies engaged the other 40 percent. This was no minor undertaking.

In its 11 months of active service, the British 21st Army Group alone engaged 82 German divisions of which 22 were destroyed or written off while another 32 surrendered at the conclusion of hostilities.

This was just part of the overall Allied undertaking in the last 11 months of the war in which the Western Allies liberated four European countries, captured the northern half of Italy, conquered two-thirds of Germany and took the surrender of over eight million German servicemen. In fact, given this vast number of prisoners taken, the results of the last year of the war allowed the Western Allies to largely catch up to the Soviets in terms of casualties inflicted upon the Germans. Thus, instead of merely being in on the kill, the Western Allies were major perpetrators of it. 

The Western Allies were also the primary agents responsible for knocking Italy out of the war. From a Soviet perspective, this garnered little notice since the Italians were only minor players on their front, but Italy’s departure from the war compelled the Germans to divert sizable resources into Southern Europe that could have otherwise been utilised in the East. By the summer of 1944, this diversion included no less than 53 German divisions stationed in Italy, the Balkans and Southern France. When looking at the duration of the five-year campaign waged in Africa and Southern Europe, the Germans suffered well over a million casualties within the theatre during the course of the war. This figure increases to more than three and a half million Axis casualties when incorporating Italian losses into the calculation (which includes Italian forces lost to the Axis when Italy capitulated in September 1943).

Likewise, with the occupation of Italian territory, the Western Allies were able to open a second front in their aerial onslaught against Germany.

During the last year of the war, Mediterranean-based bombers destroyed or extensively damaged 46 crude-oil refineries and five synthetic oil plants located within their zone of operations that accounted for roughly 60 percent of all German oil supplies.

In the Ploesti area alone, attacks from April through August 1944 destroyed 89 percent of the local production capacity and reduced gasoline and aviation fuel output by 91 percent. These results had major implications for the entire German war effort, but were particularly consequential on the eastern front since most of the lost fuel was earmarked for use there. Adding to this already stark situation, the Allies carried out extensive raids against regional transportation assets such as railway lines, marshalling yards and bridges that made it exceedingly difficult for the Germans to provide logistical support to their forward deployed units. From mid-1944 on, these two factors repeatedly assisted Soviet forces in outmanoeuvring and overcoming the largely immobile and emasculated German formations confronting them, thus greatly aiding the Soviet advance and hastening the end of the war.

Nor was this the only contribution of Allied air power. While the Soviets engaged the German army in the field, the Western Allies attacked the core of Germany’s war making ability through their strategic bombing campaign and related maritime blockade. These enterprises severely degraded Germany’s industrial output and forced the Germans to divert significant manpower and materiel resources into defensive applications. An example of the former, in 1944 German industry failed to attain assigned output goals for tank, aircraft and truck production by 35, 31 and 42 percent, respectively. According to German authorities, these shortfalls were primarily attributable to the effects of the Allied bombing. In terms of the latter, by September 1943 approximately one million service members manned the German air defence network. Materiel assets dedicated to this purpose included 8,876 88mm heavy anti-aircraft guns, 24,500 light anti-aircraft guns and 7,000 searchlights. As time went on, this commitment increased eventually peaking at 14,400 heavy and 42,000 light anti-aircraft guns.

Meanwhile, as the war progressed, the strategic bombing campaign increasingly targeted Germany’s transportation system and oil producing industries, which greatly impeded all aspects of the German war effort during the last year of the war.

Finally, the bombing campaign served as the primary catalyst by which the Allies engaged and ultimately defeated the Luftwaffe in the skies over Europe. In this regard, roughly 80 percent of Axis aircraft losses in the European conflict occurred in areas confronted by the Western Allies compared to only about 20 percent that were lost on the eastern front. 

Likewise, it was the Western Allies that compelled Germany to expend substantial resources in a costly maritime conflict. While Germany is clearly viewed as a major land power during World War II, its position as a maritime power is far less appreciated. Much of this stems from the small size of the German Kriegsmarine (navy) at the beginning of the war, which was less than a third of the size of the Royal Navy at the time. However, as the war progressed, the Germans invested significant resources and effort to expand the Kriegsmarine.

The result, over the course of the war, was that the Germans attained a very large navy with an accumulated strength of 1,640 principal warships. Roughly three-fourths of these vessels were U-boats, but this also included 450 surface warships ranging from battleships down to fleet minesweepers. As a point of comparison, the total number of like vessels that served in the Imperial Japanese Navy during the war was only 773.

Nearly all of these German warships were lost during the duration of the war overwhelmingly at the hands of the Western Allies. In particular, the British Commonwealth’s share of German maritime losses (both sole and partial) included 100 percent of their capital ships, 75 percent of their cruisers, 86 percent of their destroyers, 75 percent of their torpedo boats and escort destroyers, 86 percent of their fleet minesweepers, 77 percent of their U-boats and 73 percent of their merchant and commercial vessels.

Attaining this sizable fleet was no easy task. From 1940 through 1943 roughly 10 percent of all German armaments production was earmarked towards naval applications, mostly in the form of shipbuilding. To put this in perspective, this was a larger percentage of industrial effort than went into producing tanks during the same timeframe. Meanwhile, in terms of manpower, the Germans employed over two million men in their conduct of the maritime conflict. This included staffing for the Kriegsmarine and German merchant fleet as well as civilian support personnel and industrial workers assigned to maritime production. When viewing the immense human and materiel resources that went into producing Germany’s maritime effort and the costs it sustained, the basis for considering this a wartime front becomes clear. This was an effort that was almost entirely oriented against the West.

“Had the maritime conflict in the Atlantic and Northwest Europe not existed, the Germans could have diverted a substantial portion of this manpower and industrial effort into ground applications against the Soviet Union.”

At a minimum, this would have made hundreds of thousands of men and thousands of additional tanks and guns available to confront the Soviets.

Finally, the Western Allies provided considerable materiel support to the Soviet Union, which consisted of the dispatch of some 17,501,000 tons of weapons and supplies through the duration of the conflict of which 16,587,000 tons arrived. Among other things, this massive Western supply effort provided the Soviet Union with roughly 11 percent of its armour, 13 percent of its aircraft, 35 percent of its automotive transport, 55 percent of its aluminium (which was essential in aircraft production), 58 percent of its high-octane aviation fuel and about half of its explosives. Without these Western resources, the Soviets would have been hard pressed to overcome the Germans. This was particularly true regarding the Soviet air force, which would have been severely restricted in terms of numbers and capabilities. When confronted by a fully engaged and unimpeded Luftwaffe, which would have been the case had the Western Allies not syphoned off so much of the Luftwaffe’s strength, this would have likely resulted in the Germans maintaining air superiority over the eastern front for the duration of the conflict. Likewise, this Allied logistical support was responsible for mechanising a sizable portion of the Soviet army. When coupled with the debilitating impact that Allied bombing had on German mobility, this was a major factor in Soviet advances during the last year of the war. 

When considering the totality of these many contributions, a better understanding of the true distribution of effort in World War II’s European conflict becomes clear. While taking nothing away from the Soviet Union in terms of its immense and indispensable role in defeating Germany, the contributions made by the Western Allies, while more multifaceted, were at least comparable and equally essential. Beyond this, in a final testament to the effectiveness of the Western Allied war effort, they were able to attain these outcomes at only a fraction of the human cost paid by the Soviets.

About the author

Brian E. Walter is a historian and the author of the following books:

Blue Water War: The Maritime Struggle in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1940–1945 (Casemate, 2022)

The Longest Campaign: Britain’s Maritime Struggle in the Atlantic and Northwest Europe, 1939–1945 (Casemate, 2020).

He is a retired army officer from a combat arms branch with a BSc in Political Science and International Relations. A distinguished military graduate and recipient of the Excellence in Military History Award from the U.S. Army Center for Military History and the Association of the United States Army, he has been a student of the British military during World War II for more than 30 years. 

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